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Improving the quality of public finances (QPF) has become a new focus for European policy 
makers. This focus is largely a response to preparing the European economies for the dual 
challenge of ageing populations and increased exposure to global competition. Better QPF can 
help tackle both challenges: either directly through fiscal consolidation, pension and 
expenditure reforms or indirectly by creating conditions in support of long-term growth as 
expenditure and revenue systems become more efficient and less distortionary. At the EU level, 
the Stability and Growth Pact and the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs provide, in 
principle, the appropriate tools for fostering such policies, but in practice both instruments have 
not yet focused much on QPF which is a common component of both tools. This is partly 
because a broad-based conceptual framework on what makes up QPF has been missing. This 
paper attempts to close this gap by developing a multi-dimensional approach on QPF. The 
framework aims at bringing together the many different pieces of QPF that have so far mostly 
been studied in isolation. The paper summarises empirical findings on the links between QPF 
and growth, reviews how EU Member States fare in those aspects and analyses some links 
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Executive summary 
How can fiscal policy support sustained long-run economic growth, while at the same time 
ensuring the commonly accepted goal of sustainable fiscal positions? This question has 
emerged in recent years as a new focal point for EU policy makers and is often captured 
under the heading of 'improving the quality of public finances' (QPF). QPF can be viewed as 
encompassing all arrangements and operations of fiscal policy that support macroeconomic 
goals, in particular long-term economic growth. Thus, in contrast to past discussions on the 
short-term impact of fiscal policy on aggregate demand, QPF focuses on fiscal policy's role 
for raising the long-run growth potential. This shift largely reflects the need to prepare 
Europe's economies for a dual challenge: their ageing populations, which will put additional 
demands on public finances and globalisation which raises international competition, 
increases factor mobility and potentially heightens exposure to external shocks.  
The important role that fiscal policy should play in this respect has already been recognised 
in the EU's economic and fiscal governance framework. In particular, the Lisbon Strategy for 
Growth and Jobs stresses the intertwining between fiscal policies and structural reforms and 
suggests several fiscal policy avenues to support growth, including a stronger focus on 
growth-enhancing public spending categories and tax structures as well as mechanisms for 
greater effectiveness. At the same time, the revised Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
underlines the importance of several dimensions of QPF for an effective implementation of 
the EU's fiscal surveillance framework. 
Much analysis on the individual links between fiscal policy and economic growth has been 
carried out in the past, but a systematic and comprehensive approach that can serve as a basis 
for improved fiscal surveillance has been missing. This paper attempts to close this gap by 
providing a multi-dimensional framework of QPF which sets out six key channels through 
which fiscal policy impacts economic growth. Even though the links between the different 
dimensions of QPF and growth, on the one hand, and between various QPF dimensions 
themselves, on the other hand, are very complex and not yet always fully understood, a 
number of empirical regularities have emerged. Keeping some caveats in mind, such as 
potential simultaneity of economic growth and QPF and time lags between the 
implementation of policies and their effects, the key findings can be summarised as follows.  
The size of governments tends to matter for economic growth, especially if large public 
sectors are combined with short-comings in other dimensions of QPF. It is clear that the size 
of the public sector reflects past and current political choices that go beyond the 
macroeconomic goal of sustained economic growth. In particular, income distribution and 
social cohesion considerations also play a role, and some countries have been quite 
successful in achieving both objectives simultaneously. However, on average, empirical 
studies find that when governments become too large they tend to hamper long-run growth 
as they often go hand in hand with higher tax burdens and inefficient public administrations. 
Thus, overall there is a need to consider many factors simultaneously, such as other policy 
objectives and the types, financing and efficiency of expenditures, in an assessment of the 
costs and benefits of large governments.  
Sound and sustainable fiscal positions are preconditions for growth over the medium and 
long run. The EU's fiscal framework draws on this link which is also confirmed by our 
empirical work. The estimates substantiate earlier findings of a negative relation between 
public debt and growth, but the issue of endogeneity of debt and deficits to growth 
conditions should not be overlooked. When looking in more detail at the channels through 
which fiscal policies influence economic growth by using a growth-accounting approach, the 
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evidence tends to suggest that in countries with poor fiscal performance, private investment 
is less of a driver of growth. This indicates a possible crowding-out effect.  
While both the size of the public sector and the debt/deficit can impair growth, an important 
conditioning factor is the composition and efficiency of public expenditure. Both theoretical 
and empirical research indicates that growth can be supported when public expenditure is 
oriented towards investment. This can be particularly relevant for investment in human 
capital (through education and health spending), technical progress (R&D spending) and 
public infrastructure. However, evidence also suggests that the link between the amount of 
spending in these areas and economic growth is not automatic, but depends largely on the 
ability to achieve the envisaged outcomes (e.g. higher education attainment, more private 
investment in R&D) and overcoming existing market failures without creating new 
distortions. Thus, high efficiency and effectiveness of public spending are key to maximising 
the potential of government outlays and creating fiscal space for other demands (e.g. from 
ageing populations).  
Moreover, the structure and efficiency of revenue systems can be a factor for long-run 
growth. Since the tax structure affects labour supply and demand, incentives for investment, 
risk taking and human capital formation, it can hamper growth potential by creating various 
distortions. In addition to lowering the overall tax burden, which would have to go hand in 
hand with expenditure reforms, adapting tax structures in a revenue-neutral manner is a 
further important policy option. Such efficiency-enhancing tax reforms should also make tax 
systems more transparent and link them better to benefit systems.  
Good fiscal governance can facilitate structural reforms and is beneficial for all dimensions 
of public finances. Fiscal governance represents the institutional side of fiscal policy as it 
comprises the set of rules and procedures that determine how public budgets are prepared, 
executed and monitored. The importance of fiscal governance has been confirmed in 
empirical studies, including studies conducted by the European Commission, which have 
found that EU Member States with strong fiscal rules, medium-term budgetary frameworks 
and independent budgetary institutions, have exhibited stronger budgetary positions and have 
been more successful in fiscal consolidations.  
Non-budgetary items also form part of QPF, although in an indirect way, since public 
finance policies can impact the functioning of markets and the business environment. Well-
functioning product, services and factor markets and low administrative burdens are usually 
conducive to a higher growth potential. Our preliminary empirical work suggests that total 
factor productivity and the skilled labour contribution to GDP growth are the greatest 
beneficiaries of economies with lower regulatory burdens. These two growth components, in 
turn, have played a prominent role for growth over the past two decades. 
Overall identifying the links between QPF and growth and their interactions is a complex 
task, but the many aspects of QPF also offer policy makers a broad set of policy options. For 
example, a rather large public sector can remain compatible with strong growth prospects but 
only if at the same time budgetary positions and debt levels are sustainable, public 
administrations work efficiently, and spending and revenue systems do not create too large 
distortions on products and factors markets. Achieving this can be supported by strong fiscal 
institutions. Moreover, preliminary empirical findings indicate that QPF dimensions impact 
the various sources of GDP growth differently and therefore call for different growth 
strategies and country-specific measures. 
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1.   Introduction 
Improving the quality of public finances (QPF) has emerged as a new focus for European 
policy makers. In particular, QPF has as entered as a new aspect into the revised Stability 
and Growth Pact from 2005 and the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs. The latter assigns 
public finances to support the goals of stronger, lasting economic growth and more and 
better jobs in an environment of more closely integrated markets and greater global 
competition (
2). A linchpin of this strategy remains ensuring sound fiscal positions and 
safeguarding the long-term sustainability of public finances in light of the adverse 
demographic developments that most European countries are facing. But sound budgets are 
no longer enough. They need to be accompanied by new ways of economising on the 
delivery of public services and, at the same time, creating conditions supportive of long-term 
growth, competitiveness and a better resilience of economies to shocks (
3).  
In support of the new policy priorities, a host of analytical and empirical work on QPF has 
already been carried out. In the European Union, the Economic Policy Committee (EPC) − 
Working Group on QPF, which was formed in 2004, served as a key exchange on cross-
country experiences. At the same time, the European Commission conducted its own 
analytical work in a number of QPF areas, in part to support the EPC Working Group. Both 
focused predominantly on the link between the composition of public expenditure and 
growth (e.g. European Commission 2003, 2004), the role of fiscal governance (e.g. European 
Commission 2006a, 2007a, Curristine et al. 2007, Joumard et al. 2004) and most recently 
expenditure efficiency (e.g. Afonso et al. 2003, 2006, Afonso and St. Aubyn 2006a,b, Mandl 
et al. 2008). In the literature, one can also find a large set of theoretical and empirical 
analysis in all of the above and additional areas (e.g. taxation and growth). 
However, a conceptual framework that captures the various dimensions of QPF and their 
impacts on growth, and which could serve as a basis for upgrading EU fiscal surveillance, 
has remained a key gap. This paper attempts to fill this gap by developing a multi-
dimensional approach on QPF. The framework aims at bringing together the many different 
pieces of QPF that have so far mostly been studied in isolation. Specifically, it reviews the 
findings of earlier studies on issues such as the size of the public sector, composition and 
efficiency of expenditure, the structure of tax systems, fiscal institutions and sustainability 
and reviews how EU Member States fare in those aspects (Section 2). Moreover, it attempts 
to lay out the possible links of QPF to growth from a supply-side approach of growth 
accounting, using discriminant analysis, provides some preliminary findings and identifies 
avenues for future work (Section 3).  
                                                           
(
2)  See Integrated Guideline No. 3 of the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs (2005):   "To promote a growth- and 
employment-orientated and efficient allocation of resources, Member States should, without prejudice to guidelines on 
economic stability and sustainability, re-direct the composition of public expenditure towards growth-enhancing categories 
in line with the Lisbon strategy, adapt tax structures to strengthen growth potential, ensure that mechanisms are in place to 
assess the relationship between public spending and the achievement of policy objectives, and ensure the overall coherence 
of reform packages." For more information on the Lisbon strategy see the Commission's Web site 
http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/index_en.htm. 
(
3)  The ECOFIN council has set out the need to improve the quality of public finances in several statements (e.g., May 2008, 
October 2007, June 2007, January 2006). 
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2.  The multiple dimensions of quality of public 
finances 
2.1.  DEFINING THE QUALITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES 
Quality of public finances (QPF) is a concept with many dimensions. It can be viewed as 
encompassing all arrangements and operations of fiscal policy that support the 
macroeconomic goals of fiscal policy, in particular long-term economic growth. Thus, QPF 
comprises policies that not only ensure sound budgetary positions and long-term 
sustainability but also those that raise the production potential and facilitate the economy to 
adjust to shocks. To achieve these outcomes, public resources need to be used in an efficient 
and effective way. At the same time, governments should operate expenditure and revenue 
policies in a way that creates incentives for an efficient functioning of labour, goods and 
services markets.  
The different dimensions of quality of public finances in a growth-oriented framework are 
summarised in Graph  1. It indicates that the impact on growth can run through six 
channels (
4): (i) the size of the government, (ii) the level and sustainability of fiscal 
positions, (iii) the composition and efficiency of expenditure and (iv) the structure and 
efficiency of revenue systems. At the same time, the set-up of fiscal rules, institutions and 
procedures ((v) fiscal governance) can affect all of the above four dimensions. Moreover, 
there are many ways in which public finances can impact the functioning of markets and the 
overall business environment, which can therefore be viewed to be a sixth, though indirect, 
dimension of QPF. 
Graph 1: The quality of public finances: a multi-dimensional framework
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Conceptualising QPF as a multi-dimensional framework is needed to reflect the complex 
relationships to growth. A one-dimensional approach, for example focusing solely on the 
level of expenditure items that raise productivity, would overlook that such spending may be 
financed through a higher and distortionary tax burden. A multi-dimensional perspective 
                                                           
(
4)  While not using the label 'quality of public finances', for example the European Central Bank (2001) employs a similar 
classification on the links between fiscal policies and economic growth. 
  7 
thus helps overcoming this 'omitted variables problem'. It also highlights that achieving some 
of the QPF aspects can reinforce others. For example, greater efficiency in spending can 
facilitate ensuring fiscal sustainability, either directly by creating additional fiscal space or 
indirectly through higher growth if efficiency it is also translated into lowering the overall 
tax burden. Similarly, a less distortive revenue structure can impact growth and thereby 
contribute to achieving sustainability. However, assessing these interlinkages empirically is 
extremely difficult due to data availability, an incomplete understanding of the transmission 
mechanisms and reversed causality. Thus, a simplification of some dimensions is called 
for (
5). 
Even though the conceptual framework here explicitly uses economic growth as the ultimate 
benchmark to assess QPF, it should not be overlooked that large parts of fiscal policies have 
other objectives. In particular social spending, which accounts for about 55% of public 
spending in the EU, has primarily redistribution, insurance and consumption-smoothing 
motives. Similarly, many revenue policies, such as a progressive income tax, are geared 
toward redistribution of income or the allocation of resources toward specific sectors. This 
framework does not aim to capture how well public finances perform in achieving those 
other objectives. Nevertheless, it allows to captures some of these aspects indirectly. For 
example, an efficient use of social expenditure geared toward better social cohesion will help 
avoid an unnecessary tax burden on the economy or crowding out of investment-related 
public spending and thereby indirectly also serve the growth objective. 
2.2.  THE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT 
2.2.1.  Why do governments differ in size? 
Economic theory provides two main strands of arguments why the size of public sectors can 
be expected to differ over time and across countries (
6). The first line of arguments builds on 
Wagner's Law, according to which the government's share in GDP increases more than 
proportionally in GDP. As nations get wealthier, the demand for public goods expands while 
at the same time the ability to raise revenues rises. Examples for the driving forces behind a 
greater demand for public goods are a greater urbanisation of countries or ageing of 
populations. A supply-side explanation has been added known as 'Baumol's disease'. It 
argues that the government share rises because public sector wages increase more strongly 
than public sector productivity while the demand for public services is relatively price-
inelastic (
7). 
The second strand of arguments is of a political economy nature. To get re-elected, fiscal 
policy, in particular expenditure policy, tends to be time inconsistent and biased toward 
higher deficits and bigger public sectors. This tendency is stronger, the larger the number of 
parties forming the government, the higher the frequency of elections and in case of 
proportional rather than majority-based election systems (e.g. Persson and Tabellini, 1999, 
2002). Another political economy argument bases the size of governments on rent-seeking 
agents who support larger public sectors with the objective of benefiting from a 
redistribution of income (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). 
                                                           
(
5)  A good starting point to structure the channels through which public finances affect growth is a neoclassical production 
function framework (see Section 3). Output growth is herein determined by changes in the stocks and utilisation of capital 
and labour and total factor productivity. The six dimensions of QPF can have a direct or indirect bearing on each of the 
components of the production function (see for example Gerson (1998) for a similar approach).  
(
6)  See for example Holsey and Borcherding (1997) and Peacock and Scott (2000) for an overview of the literature. 
(
7)  Baumol's (1967) distinguished more generally the productivity growth in services and manufacturing but his model has 
then been transferred to public services. 
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Aside from these arguments, the size of the public sector ultimately reflects political choices. 
How much of public goods to provide (e.g. public infrastructure, environmental protection, 
defence, law and order) and how to address market failures and externalities depends on 
country-specific circumstances that are partly a reflection of policies (e.g. competition 
regulations) and objectives (e.g. income distribution) and partly exogenous (e.g. geopolitical 
situation or socio-cultural features). A classical case are different social models with those 
providing more generous insurance also contributing to a more equitable income distribution 
but at the price of a higher tax burden on the economy. But even when a choice is made to 
provide a public service, such as education, it does not necessarily mean that it has to be 
'produced' by the public sector itself but it could be merely financed with public funds (e.g. 
education grants) and offered by private service providers.  
A simple graphical inspection of recent 
data for the EU Member States and a 
few non-EU comparators reveals only a 
weak link between the size of the public 
sector and income. Graph  2 indicates 
that, while varying widely, the 
expenditure-to-GDP ratio is only 
weakly correlated with per capita GDP 
when assessing the averages of the past 
five years for the EU Member States 
and seven non-EU industrial 
countries (
8). The correlation is 
somewhat stronger when the non-EU 
comparators are excluded from the 
sample, since they exhibit an above 
average income but a below average 
size of government.  
Graph 2: Size of government and income for EU Member 
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ratios in 17 of the 24 countries considered here. But nevertheless, the public sectors 
continued to be bigger in 2003-07 than in 1980-84 in more than half of the economies 
                                                           
(
8)  The non-EU countries included as comparators are Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the 
United States. Since not all of those countries are included in the Eurostat (Ameco) database going back to 1980, the data 
shown in charts including non-EU comparators have been taken from the IMF International Financial Statistics. The 
expenditure-to-GDP ratios are on average about one percentage point lower than the corresponding figures from the 
Eurostat (Ameco) database. 
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(Table  1). At the same time, public sectors in old EU Member States have remained 
significantly larger than those in the non-EU comparators, with the differences in size 
fluctuating between 8½ and 12% of GDP since 1980. 
Econometric studies confirm the mixed 
evidence on Wagner's Law. They tend to 
find a positive relation between the 
public expenditure-to-GDP ratio and per 
capita income only for some countries 
and certain time periods (Table  2)  (
10). 
Typically when low and high-income 
countries are included in a panel 
analysis, a significant link is established. 
However, for OECD countries the 
empirical backing for Wagner's Law is 
weak, particularly since the 1970s (e.g. 
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2.2.2  What are the implications for economic growth? 
The theoretical literature argues that the long-term link between the size of government and 
economic growth is hump-shaped. When the government sector is very small, long-term 
growth could be increased by raising productivity of capital and labour through the provision 
of public goods. The marginal increase is positive but decreasing with the size of the public 
sector and becomes negative when the distortion that additional taxes create turn the 
productivity gains for the economy around. Where the turning point lies, remains a key 
question and depends on structural factors, such as the development stage of the economy, 
the composition of expenditure and tax structures chosen to fund public spending. 
For many non-transition countries in- and 
outside the EU, larger public sectors have
been associated with below average real
GDP growth rates. Graph  3 depicts this
bottom-line by grouping non-transition
economies in the EU and the seven non-
EU comparators by growth and size of the
public sector, while not accounting for
any other factors. During 1980-2007, 
high-growth countries (i.e. the upper
quartile of the sample) had significantly
smaller governments than those that grew
less rapidly. Countries with the lowest
real GDP growth rates (i.e. the lowest
quartile) were also those with the highest
expenditure-to-GDP  ratios.  This  finding









































Note: Data for EU and non-EU industrial countries, excluding transition 
economies. High-growth countries comprise the upper quartile and low-
growth countries the lower quartile.
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics.
 
is robust for the three decades since 1980 as well as the entire sample period.  
                                                           
(
10) Some of the earlier empirical work, which tended to support Wagner's Law, was later found to have been biased since the 
variables were non-stationary. 
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Most empirical studies that explicitly consider also other variables than just the public sector 
size confirm an association of larger governments with significantly lower real GDP growth 
rates (
11)(
12). Out of the nine studies surveyed in Table 3 for industrial countries (all prepared 
relatively recently between 1997 and 2008), eight find a significantly negative relation to 
growth. This is in line also with earlier papers. Nevertheless, the empirical studies are not 
without problems. In particular, the question of causality is an issue since higher growth can 
facilitate reducing the government sector. Moreover, the cross-country evidence overlooks 
that some individual countries have succeeded in maintaining rather high growth rates 
despite relatively large public sectors since they also faired strongly on other dimensions of 
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Empirical findings on the link between government size and growth: a survey of recent studies
Notes: IV = Instrumental variables method; 2SLS = two-stage least squares method. The results by Bassanini et al. (2001) are also presented in OECD 
(2000).  
In addition to the link to long-term growth, the size of government also matters for the 
automatic stabilisation properties of fiscal policy. For instance, in case a negative demand 
shocks occurs and nominal spending is left unchanged, the expenditure-to-GDP ratio rises 
providing a positive counterbalancing effect to the shock. Consequently, many studies have 
pointed to a trade-off between the stabilisation benefits of larger governments and the 
negative implications for long-term growth (e.g. Martinez-Mongay and Sekkat 2003, Brunila 
et al. 2003). However, under certain circumstances this trade-off can largely be resolved. 
Buti et al. (2003) present a model in which taxation not only affects aggregate demand but 
also aggregate supply (higher taxation steepens the supply curve and the underlying Phillips-
curve, i.e. it deteriorates the inflation-unemployment trade-off). In such a setting, a larger 
                                                           
(
11) However, in a seminal paper Easterly and Robelo (1993) using a cross-section data set for the period 1970-1988 for 100 
developing and industrial countries find that the link between fiscal variables (other than public investment in 
transportation and communication) and budget deficits is statistically fragile. For example, the authors find a significant 
negative relation between the expenditure-to-GDP ratio and real per capita GDP growth in their base regression but when 
they add other explanatory variables (monetisation and trade openness of the economy) the effect is no longer significant. 
(
12) Bjørnskov et al. (2007) make an attempt to link government size and life satisfaction, which could be viewed as a measure 
for welfare. In a study for 74  countries the authors find that life satisfaction decreases with higher government 
consumption. However, this negative link decreases with higher overall government effectiveness. 
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government sector helps stabilise output in case of demand shocks but would destabilises 
output in case of supply shocks, if the government size exceeds a certain threshold. The 
authors find that the maximum stabilising size of government is lower for small open 
economies. Their models suggests a threshold of about 35% of GDP for small open 
economies and somewhat higher or about 40% of GDP for large open economies. Thus, Buti 
et al. suggest that reducing the government size with the aim to eliminate distortions and 
encourage long-run growth, is not necessarily detrimental for the functioning of automatic 
stabilisers. The multi-dimensional framework of QPF presented here argues in the same 
vein. Larger public sectors do not necessarily have to impinge on the growth potential if 
distortions are kept low enough through, for example, efficient expenditure and flexible 
markets.  
2.3.  FISCAL DEFICITS AND SUSTAINABILITY 
Sound fiscal positions, over the medium and long term, are a precondition for 
macroeconomic stability and sustainable economic growth. The EU fiscal framework is built 
on this premise with the added perspective that irresponsible fiscal policies would interfere 
with centralised monetary policy-making and spill over to other members of the monetary 
union and create costs for them (
13).  
The main transmission channels from large deficits and high debt to growth can be 
summarised as follows (
14). In all channels, public debt impinges on savings and investment 
decisions. First, large public debt may raise the real interest rate and thereby crowd out 
private investment. Second, if economic agents view the current fiscal policy to be 
unsustainable, they would increase their savings to protect against future tax increases. 
Similarly, investment may be discouraged if future returns are expected to be taxed at higher 
rate. This could in part also lead to capital flight. The same applies in case great fluctuations 
in fiscal policies complicate long-term decision-making by private agents. And third, ill-
designed consolidation efforts to reduce deficits and debt, for example through cuts in public 
investment, may negatively impact long-run growth. A similar effect can be expected from 
distortionary attempts to reduce the interest costs of public debt, for example through special 
tax concessions for public debt holders.  
Empirical evidence broadly supports the negative link between fiscal deficits and public debt 
and growth. In many growth regressions, for industrial and/or developing countries, these 
fiscal performance variables have been identified as negative contributors to growth (e.g. 
Tanzi and Chalk, 2002, Pattillo et al., 2004, Easterly and Rebelo 1993). But one needs to 
caution again of the problem of reversed causality (i.e. higher economic growth also helping 
to bring down the debt-to-GDP ratio). This problem is also inherent when illustrating the 
simple bi-variate relation of public debt and growth in Graph 4. The data for EU Member 
States and the non-EU comparators illustrate that high-growth countries had significantly 
lower public debt-to-GDP ratios than those that grew below average (
15). Moreover, high-
debt EU Member States were also those with rather large public sectors (Graph 5).  
                                                           
(
13) For an overview of the motivation and functioning of the EU fiscal framework see for example European Commission 
(2008a) and contributions in Brunila et al. (2003). 
(
14) Tanzi and Chalk (2002) distinguish six channels for the links between high public debt and growth in the EU. The 
presentation here, while broadly following their arguments, condenses them to three. 
(
15) The findings illustrated in Graph 4 remain broadly unchanged if one excludes Luxembourg (which has a very low debt 
level) and the new Member States Cyprus and Malta from the sample. 
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Note: Data for EU and non-EU industrial countries, excluding transition economies. 
High-growth countries comprise the upper quartile and low-growth countries the 
lower quartile.
Sources: Commission services and IMF International Financial Statistics.





































Note: Data are averages for  2003-07 for EU Member States and non-EU industrial 
countries.


























Going forward, some EU Member States are in a precarious situation. They are at high risk 
that their public finances become unsustainable given their current debt levels and fiscal 
positions and in view of projected costs from pension and long-term care systems (see 
European Commission, 2006b). This could consequently also have negative implications for 
their long-term growth prospects, in particular in view of already large, and potentially 
rising, public sectors.  
There is also some evidence that fiscal policy variability is associated with lower growth. In 
particular, Fatas and Mihov (2003) find that for a set of 91 countries higher volatility of 
discretionary government spending significantly increased output variability which in turn 
lowered growth (
16). The latter link is however not significant for OECD countries. In a 
recent study, Afonso and Furceri (2008) show that not only discretionary changes in 
expenditure matter but also cyclical ones. They find that in EU countries a higher volatility 
of the cyclical component of public expenditure has worsened the growth performance (
17).  
2.4.  THE COMPOSITION AND EFFICIENCY OF EXPENDITURE 
In recent years, European policy makers have stressed that shifting expenditure toward 
'growth-enhancing' areas and becoming more efficient in the use of public resources are key 
avenues for supporting growth. The Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs, specifically 
Integrated Guideline No. 3 (see Section 1), makes explicit reference to both objectives. In 
particular, the role of expenditure composition has been studied in great detail and country 
experiences have been analysed to draw policy lessons (
18). Given this wealth of earlier 
work, only a brief summary is provided below, with a focus on efficiency of expenditure, 
which has moved to the centre of attention more recently. 
                                                           
(
16) A problem in such studies is the potential reversed causality between output volatility and expenditure volatility. Fatas and 
Mihov (2003) attempt to account for this by measuring discretionary government spending variability as the variance of the 
residuals derived from a regression which explains real government spending in terms of real GDP, various control 
variables and deterministic components such as time trends.  
(
17)  For a wide sample of industrial and developing countries from 1960-2005, Herrera (2007) finds a positive relation between 
fiscal policy volatility (measured as the variation coefficient of public expenditure growth) and real GDP volatility. He 
associates the latter with lower growth. A caveat of the broad sample is that it also includes crisis countries. 
(
18)  See for example European Commission (2003, 2004) and the papers in Deroose and Kastrop (2008). 
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2.4.1.  Composition of expenditure 
While theory offers a framework to identify 'growth-enhancing' types of expenditure, in 
practice this assessment is difficult to make. In theory, public expenditure that provides 
public goods and addresses market failures and externalities can be growth enhancing. In 
practice, this could apply to, for example, creating public infrastructure, giving liquidity-
constrained households and small and medium-size enterprises access to credit to invest in 
human and physical capital or creating a social safety net where the market fails to provide 
for it. All these types of expenditure can raise labour and capital productivity. More 
generally, public investment is associated with a higher marginal productivity than public 
consumption. However, these examples also highlight that the underlying identification 
problems of expenditure as 'productive' is intrinsically linked to the existence of public 
goods, the type of market failure and externality and the ability of public spending to resolve 
it without creating greater distortions (Gerson, 1998).  
Against the backdrop of such methodological difficulties, empirical studies have 
nevertheless identified certain types of expenditure that have been associated with higher 
growth. Government expenditure has thereby either been broken down by economic or 
functional classifications (or, in some cases, a combination of the two).  
Using the economic classification, the results for public investment have been mixed. Gerson 
(1998), who reviews some of the empirical studies, reports that a positive link between total 
public investment and growth is only found in some cases. More recent studies are also 
inconclusive. For example, Romero de Avila and Strauch (2003) estimate public investment 
to have a positive effect on growth in the EU, while Afonso and Furceri (2008) do not find 
public investment to be significant in explaining growth in the EU and OECD. By contrast, 
public transfers and consumption are typically estimated to negatively impact growth. There 
are two possible explanations for these findings. First, the share of public investment in the 
EU is rather small at about 3% of GDP which limits its potential impact on long-run growth. 
On the other hand, public consumption is large at 21%. Thus, empirical studies which 
include both variables in growth regressions may pick up the negative impact of the size of 
governments rather than the composition of public spending. And second, it appears that 
well-targeted public expenditure, rather than overall public investment, is growth enhancing. 
This follows from studies that combine the economic with the functional classification, and 
show that investment in certain areas, in particular transportation and communication, 
appears to be more systematically matched with higher growth (see Gerson, 1998). 
Graph 6 shows data for the EU and the
non-EU comparators for 1995-2007 
indicating a weak positive bi-variate 
correlation between overall public
investment and growth − however,
without taking any other factors into
account. 
Using a functional classification, the
types of public expenditure that have
been found to raise growth vary
strongly with the data sample. Some
studies find only education, R&D and
public infrastructure spending to be
growth enhancing, others also include
spending  on  health,  public  order and 
Graph 6:Public investment and economic growth in the EU17 




















































Note: EU-17 comprise the EU-15 and Cyprus and Malta. Data are averages for 
1995-2007, excluding New Zealand.
Source: Commission services.
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safety, and environment protection (European Commission, 2003, 2004). For illustrative 
purposes, we use a tight definition in Graph 7 (R&D, public transportation and education 
spending). In that case, the share in total public primary spending ranges from less than 13% 
in Germany (of those countries with complete data) to more than 24% in Latvia (if a wider 
definition is used, it can be up to 45 % of total public outlays, see European Commission, 
2004). It is striking that particularly most transition economies are allocating a rather high 
share of public resources to these productive purposes, which may partly reflect their 
catching-up needs and the support from the cohesion policy programmes.  






























































































Note: 2005 or latest date available. For BE, BG, CY, EL, HU, IT, LU no data is available on public transportation spending and for  IT also no data on R&D spending.. 
Sources: Commission services, Eurostat and OECD.
 
Overall, empirical evidence seems to support the hypothesis that certain types of public 
expenditure can foster while others may deter economic growth. The latter tends to be 
particularly the case when spending is not well targeted and its financing creates negative 
externalities (through high debt levels or distortionary taxes). Thus, a reallocation of public 
resources alone cannot be a sufficient strategy to improve the QPF but it needs to be 
supplemented by a more efficient use of public resources, which would also allow lowering 
the size of the public sector and create fiscal space for new demands. 
2.4.2. Efficiency and effectiveness of expenditure 
Assessing the efficiency and effectiveness of public spending is a focal point when analysing 
the QPF as it establishes the link between the input of public resources and the output 
(efficiency) and outcomes (effectiveness) that they create. Empirically, however, this 
analysis faces many challenges. 
Approaches to measuring expenditure efficiency (19) 
The key challenges comprise data requirements and weaknesses with statistical estimation 
methods. The different types of data needed to calculate efficiency of expenditure categories 
are summarised in Graph  8. The amount of public funds used for the various policy 
objectives (e.g. education, health or R&D spending) needs to be identified. While these data 
may be available to individual governments, they are often not publicly accessible and 
comparable across countries. The publication of the COFOG data by the EU-27 has been a 
major step forward in that respect but the breakdown into ten functional groups has still not 
                                                           
(
19)  See also European Commission (2008a) on how to capture public sector efficiency and productivity in national accounts. 
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proved to be sufficient for more detailed analysis (
20). Due to these data shortcomings, but 
also to neglect differences in factor prices, studies often focus on 'technical' inputs instead 
(e.g. the number of teachers, doctors, nurses and researchers). Similarly, decisions need to be 
made on choosing relevant output variables, such as educational attainment, number of cured 
patients or life expectancy. And 
finally, these outputs should be 
closely linked with the ultimate 
policy objectives or outcomes, such 
as a higher labour productivity, 
higher quality of life or faster 
technical progress  (
21). In the 
'production process' the outputs and 
outcomes are also affected by 
environmental factors (e.g. parents' 
educational attainment impact that 
of their children and dietary habits 
affect health policy outcomes), 
which may or may not be within 
the realm of policy makers. And 
lastly, the choice of statistical 
methods to estimate efficiency matters. Non-parametric and parametric methods can be 
distinguished differing by the assumptions about the shape of the efficiency frontier and the 
treatment of environmental variables (see Box 1). Both methods measure (in)efficiency as 
the distance to a production possibility (efficiency) frontier.  
Graph 8:The concepts of efficiency and effectiveness
Funding (€)
Environmental factors (e.g. socio-economic background, 










Given the role that education attainment can play to enhance growth, it is important to 
understand whether public 
resources on education are used in 
an efficient way  (
22). Just raising 
the level of public education 
spending does not seem to be 
enough, even though it is typically 
found to be growth-enhancing, 
since the empirical link between 
education spending and student 
performance is rather weak (see 
for an overview Verhoeven et al., 
2007 Greenwald et al. 1996, 
Hanushek and Kimko, 2000, and 
Hanushek, 2002). This is also 
reflected in Graph  9 where no 
correlation can be detected 
between the amount of public 
expenditure    on    primary    and  
Graph 9:Public expenditure on primary and secondary 
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Note: Expenditure data for AT, CA and NZ are from OECD for 2000-2004.


























                                                           
(
20) For example, COFOG-I does not include data on R&D or public infrastructure spending. However going forward, this 
information would be part of COFOG-II. 
(
21) Since outcomes are particularly hard to determine, empirical studies often focus on efficiency rather than effectiveness 
measures. Thus, in the rest of this section, we will only use the term efficiency, but it should be clear that higher 
effectiveness is the ultimate objective. 
(
22)  See Hanushek and Woessmann (2007) and Abu-Ghaida (2007) on the link between education skills and growth. 
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Box 1: Approaches to estimate efficiency 
The decision of using non-parametric or parametric approaches in empirical studies on expenditure 
efficiency, is strongly linked to the underlying data set. For cross-country comparisons at a 
macroeconomic level, non-parametric approaches have been particularly popular (e.g., Afonso and St. 
Aubyn 2006a, 2006b, Hauner 2007, Sutherland et al. 2007, Verhoeven et al. 2007). For micro-level data 
(e.g. school level) or cross-section data, also parametric approaches have been used (e.g., Pereira and 
Moreira 2007, Sutherland et al. 2007 and Kempkes and Pohl 2007). Both approaches have different 
features which are briefly reviewed below. Common to both methods are the problems of identifying 
appropriate indicators (as described in the text) and determining the appropriate lag structures to capture 
that policy measures may impact outputs and outcomes with a considerable delay. In practice, period 
averages are frequently used which also solves the problem of cyclicality. 
Non-parametric approaches 
They construct an envelope around the observed combinations of inputs and outputs. The Free Disposable 
Hull (FDH) approach does this in a step-wise way; the Data Envelope Approach (DEA)  (
1) in a 
continuous way, which assumes convexity (see graph below). FDH and DEA use linear programming 
methods to estimate the frontier allowing for multiple inputs and outputs. Thereby, each country's 
efficiency is calculated relative to that of its peers. Efficiency is measured as the distance between a 
country point and the efficiency frontier, defined as a linear combination of best practice observations (
2). 
Efficient countries have scores of one, inefficient ones have scores between zero and less than one. For 
example, an input efficiency score of 0.6 would indicate that the same output could be produced with 
only 60% of the inputs. By definition, the countries (or other decision-making units) with the lowest input 


























Input inefficiency = 
x2/(x1+x2)
1 2 x x
Data envelope analysis (DEA)
 
Non-parametric approaches have several caveats (
3). First, estimates are very sensitive to measurement 
error, outliers and sample size. Since each observation can determine a segment of the efficiency frontier, 
outliers will affect the efficiency score for all its peers. In the same vein, when a relevant observation 
which represents best practices has been omitted from the sample, it may lead to an overall 
overestimation of efficiency. Second, the number of inputs and outputs that can be used is limited. A too 
great number would result in the programming exercise delivering too many efficient linear 
combinations, possibly resulting in all countries being efficient. And third, DEA analysis does not take 
into account environmental factors. For example, education outcomes are also a function of income or 
parent attainment. To account for this, DEA scores are in a second step regressed on a set of explanatory 
variables, most of which can be influenced by policy makers only over the long run. This is typically 
done through censored regression techniques (Tobit) or bootstrap methods. The efficiency scores are then 
corrected for the impact of exogenous factors. For example, the efficiency score of a country with an 
above average income and parent attainment would be revised downwards. 
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Box 1: (continued) 
Parametric approaches 
They estimate a stochastic efficiency frontier assuming a specific functional form (e.g., a Cobb-Douglas 
type function). When compared to the DEA, the frontier will be fit through the cloud of data points rather 
than enveloping it (see graph above). Using further assumptions, the residual is then decomposed into two 
components: a random error term and an inefficiency term. While parametric approaches rely on strong 
assumptions and require a large number of observations, they also have several advantages. They 
explicitly deal with statistical noise and incorporate environmental variables directly in the efficiency 
estimates. Moreover, they allow in principle standard statistical testing. 
_________________ 
(1) The DEA originates on work by Debreu (1951), Koopmanns (1951) and Farrell (1957) and was extended by Charnes 
et al. (1978) and Faere et al. (1994).  
(2) For an analytical description of the linear programming problem see for e.g Afonso et al. (2006) or Hauner (2007). 
(3) Drawbacks of non-parametric and parametric approaches are summarised for example in Sutherland et al. (2007) and 
Cincera et al. (2008). The former also offer options on how to overcome some of the caveats. 
 
secondary education (during 2000-2004) and education attainment as measured by the latest 
PISA scores for EU and OECD countries (
23). Thus, a more efficient use of public resources 
on education has become a key objective of policy makers, in particular with the aim to raise 
educational attainment rather than to economise on education spending.  
Efficiency estimates show large room for improvements in most countries. Focusing on 
output efficiency, a recent OECD study (Sutherland et al., 2007) for over 6.000 schools finds 
that the median school in the OECD could improve learning outcomes by 22% by using the 
same amount of resources (in the case of the study these comprise teacher-student-ratio, and 
computer availability) (
24). Afonso and St. Aubyn (2006a), using country-level data, find 
somewhat smaller margins for improvement of on average 13%. Both studies are correcting 
their estimates for environmental factors (
25). The efficiency estimates and country rankings 
are rather sensitive to the estimation method, the definition of the input and output 
variables (
26) and the countries 
included in the study. 
Nevertheless, across various 
studies a pattern emerges which 
is summarised in Table  4. 
Ireland, Finland and Japan are 
consistently in the most efficient 
group of countries largely 
because they achieve far above 
average PISA scores. On the 
other hand, Portugal and 
Most efficient quartile Middle two quartiles Least efficient quartile
FI, IE, JP, PL, PT, SK
BE, CZ, ES, FR, IT, HU, 
NL, SE, UK, AU, CA, NZ, 
CH
DE, DK, EL, LU, NO, US




hich are corrected for environmental variables, in Afonso and St. Aubyn 
(2006a), Sutherland et al. (2007) and Verhoeven et al. (2007). The quartiles are 
determined by the average rank across a number of specifications in these three 
papers.
able 4:
stimates for education spending efficiency
                                                           
(
23) The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is an internationally standardised assessment in the domains 
of reading, mathematical and scientific literacy.  
(
24)  When these estimates of technical efficiency are translated into cost efficiency estimates, the room for improvement shrinks 
to 5%. This is largely due to the use of country-level rather than school-level data for the cost efficiency estimates and the 
lower number of observations and degree of variation. 
(
25) Cross-country studies for industrial economies that use an FDH or DEA approach without such correction include 
Clements (2002), Herrera (2007), Herrera and Pang (2005), Mattina (2007), Mattina and Gunnarsson (2007) and Kuhry et 
al. (2004). 
(
26) Afonso and St. Aubyn (2006a) use the teacher-student ratio and hours taught per year as input, the average PISA scores as 
output, and per capita GDP and parent attainment as environmental variables. 
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Slovakia are considered to be relatively efficient despite their below average PISA scores 
because their use of technical resources has been rather economical (
27). Poland combines 
both aspects: a slightly above average PISA score with below average use of resources.  
Analysing ways to achieve these efficiency gains lies beyond the scope of this paper, but the 
role of institutional factors should be mentioned. The OECD has created institutional 
indicators of the primary and secondary education sectors based on a questionnaire to its 
Member States (see Gonand et al., 2007). They include (i) the ability to prioritise and 
allocate resources, (ii) the type of management at the local level (outcome-focused, 
managerial autonomy) and (iii) service provision through benchmarking and user choice. For 
four of the countries (FI, JP, PT, SK) that have been identified above to be among the most 
efficient these indicators are available. Three of them (FI, JP, PT) are, according to the self-
reported information, exceptionally strong in matching public education resources to specific 
needs. The other institutional strengths and weaknesses differ however. Outcome-focused 
management and managerial autonomy is particularly strong Slovakia, and benchmarking 
and user choice in Portugal.  
Health spending 
A second focus of empirical studies on public spending efficiency has been the health sector. 
The link to growth is twofold. First, fiscally sustainable health care systems avoid that 
additional pressures are created on public budgets that would expand the overall government 
size and/or crowd out other spending. And second, a healthier population can impact 
positively on labour input and productivity. At the same time, health care systems, by 
providing insurance against the risk of illness, allow to smooth consumption and help 
prevent poverty. Public health expenditure in the EU exceeds education expenditure and 
averaged 6.5% of GDP in 2005, ranging from 3.0% in Cyprus to 7.1% in the United 
Kingdom. 
However, capturing efficiency of
health spending is very difficult.
Empirical work has proceeded in
the same vein as for estimates on
education spending efficiency
(see summary findings of two
studies in Table 5) (
28).But while
the PISA scores have been
broadly accepted as useful
outcome indicators, there is less
consensus   on  health  outcomes. 
Most efficient quartile Middle two quartiles Least efficient quartile
CZ, ES, PO, PT
DE, DK, FI, FR, IT, JP, 
LU, HU, SE, UK
AU, CA, CH, US
Notes: The classification is based on estimates of technical and cost efficiency, 
corrected for environmental variables, in Afonso and St. Aubyn (2006b) and 
Verhoeven et al. (2007). The quartiles are determined by the average rank in both 
studies. Countries are only included if covered by both studies.
Table 5:
Estimates for health spending efficiency
Variables typically include life expectancy or infant mortality, but it has been argued that 
better indicators would be quality-adjusted life years or number of avoidable deaths (which 
are available only for few countries) (
29). The World Health Organization's (WHO) work in 
this regard, where countries were ranked according to the efficiency of their health care 
                                                           
(
27) It should be noted that the econometric studies use technical (e.g. student-teacher ratios) rather than monetary input 
variables. Moreover, it should be recalled that the countries with the highest output and the lowest input are automatically 
considered to be efficient when using non-parametric techniques. 
(
28) Cross-country studies for industrial economies that use an FDH or DEA approach without such correction include Herrera 
and Pang (2005), Lugaresi et al. (2007), Räty and Luoma (2005), Mattina (2007), Mattina and Gunnarsson (2007) and 
Pommer et al. (2004). 
(
29) Ways to advance the analysis on health care sector efficiency are discussed in Häkkinen and Joumard (2007). They offer 
three options: system level analysis, disease level analysis and sub-sector level analysis (e.g., ambulatory care and 
pharmaceuticals). To assess the link between the QPF and growth, the first option seems preferable but it faces the 
problems discussed in the text. 
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systems, based on stochastic frontier estimates, has not been updated since it was met in 
2000 with strong criticism. 
Efficiency of public spending for other functions 
Research on efficiency of other areas of public spending has been scarce. A recent study on 
the efficiency of public R&D spending (Cincera et al. 2008) conducts parametric and non-
parametric (corrected for exogenous factors) estimations using private expenditure on R&D 
as an output variable, arguing that the public R&D spending is effective if it spurs private 
R&D. The authors find that non-EU industrial countries (Australia, Canada, Japan, New 
Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland and the US) outperform the EU (
30). Using the COFOG 
classification, Eugène (2007) estimates the efficiency of public spending on public order and 
safety and the provision of general public services. He finds Austria, Denmark and Finland 
to be most efficient for the former and Denmark, Finland and the United Kingdom to be 
most efficient for the latter. However, these results can only be indicative since the estimates 
have not been corrected for exogenous factors. And finally, studies have attempted to 
measure the efficiency of social spending not from the economic growth perspective but 
linked to the objectives of poverty reduction, income redistribution and insurance provision. 
Work includes those by Afonso et al. (2008) and the European Commission (2008c). While 
the former paper finds the Nordic countries among the most efficient using a DEA approach, 
the latter work suggests a broaderwider use of indicators. 
2.5.  STRUCTURE AND EFFICIENCY OF REVENUE SYSTEMS 
The link between taxation and growth is very complex. While theory and empirical studies 
provide some broad lessons on which tax structures are typically associated with higher 
growth, the devil is in the detail (
31). For example, the ability of certain tax structures to 
enhance growth depends on the specific economic structures (e.g. the labour participation 
rate and share of shadow economy), institutional features (e.g. efficiency of tax 
administrations) and the interaction between specific taxes, tax expenditures and benefit 
systems. Thus, reforming tax systems with a view to supporting growth needs to take these 
country-specific circumstances carefully into account. Moreover, there is a complex link 
between the overall tax burden and economic activity, which depends on the type and 
efficiency of public expenditure that is being financed through public revenues. 
An assessment is further complicated by trade-offs between the growth and other objectives. 
Tax systems' primary objective is to raise the necessary funds for public goods and services 
while at the same time reallocating income (e.g. through a progressive income tax), 
addressing externalities (e.g. through environmental taxes) or aiming to support a specific 
allocation of resources (e.g. as part of housing or industrial policy). Thus, a discussion of 
growth-enhancing tax structures has to either take these objectives as given or point to 
potential trade-offs and assess options to optimise them.  
Focusing only on the growth objective, the literature on revenue structures offers a broad set 
of findings, but they remain nevertheless debated (
32). In particular the choice of indicators is 
critical. For example, it is often difficult to find comparable marginal effective tax rates 
                                                           
(
30)  See also Mandl et al. (2008) for an overview on issues when assessing R&D spending efficiency. 
(
31) Clearly, this brief section here can only provide a rather simplified summary of a few key issues on the relationship 
between revenue structures and revenue system efficiency and growth.  
(
32)  The ongoing OECD's project on 'Tax and economic growth' is analysing in detail the links between tax policies and growth 
and aims to identify tax policy priorities related to growth. A mapping of the different types of taxes and drivers of growth 
can be found in Heady (2007).  
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across time and countries, and results seem to vary with the development stage of 
economies (
33). Nevertheless, a main set of issues can be summarised as follows. 
A shift from labour to consumption taxation can enhance growth. Indirect taxation has a 
wider tax base than labour taxation as it also taxes accumulated wealth and profit incomes. 
Thus, it is less distortive for labour markets. A revenue-neutral shift could reduce the tax rate 
on labour with positive implications for labour supply and demand. This hypothesis finds 
support in growth regressions and model simulations which identify a positive link between 
tax shift and growth (European Commission, 2008a, 2006c, 2007a, Gray et al., 2007, Garcia-
Escribano and Mehrez, 2004, Bleaney et al., 2000).  
A commonly used indicator to measure
disincentives from labour taxation is the
tax wedge. It captures the difference
between what workers receive and what
firms pay. A higher marginal tax wedge
may discourage labour. In the EU, (
34) 
this labour tax wedge is significantly
higher than in non-EU comparator
countries (Graph  10). In particular
countries with large public sectors tend
to tax labour income highly, which
could be problematic for growth.
However, in five EU Member States
(Ireland, France, Germany, Hungary,
the Netherlands) tax reforms have
helped to lower the marginal tax wedge
by more than 5  percentage points
between   2000   and   2007.   Only   in 































































Note: Tax wedge is defined as marginal personal income tax and social security 
contribution rates on gross labour income for an average income earner. No data are 
available for BG, CY, EE, LT, LV, MT, RO, SI. Averages are unweighted.





Greece has it surged (by more than 9 percentage points) in parallel to the expansion of its 
public sector. 
But the size and duration of growth effects from a tax shift from labour to consumption 
taxation vary strongly with structural factors. A recent simulation by the European 
Commission (2008a) for the euro area highlights a tax shift of 1% of GDP could increase 
employment by 0.25% and real GDP by about 0.2% in the long run. Most positive effects 
arise in the first three years and depend strongly on how much the increase in indirect 
taxation results in higher consumer prices and a real reduction of transfer payments and 
wages. Moreover, institutional factors, such as wage-bargaining setups and minimum wages 
interact with tax policy in many ways and will affect the outcome of tax shifting policies 
(European Commission, 2006c, Valenduc, 2007).  
Across EU Member States, the revenue structure varies strongly and only a slight shift 
toward indirect taxation has emerged (
35). The reliance on direct taxation and social security 
contributions in total public revenues ranges from less than 50% in Bulgaria to 72% in 
Belgium. On average, countries with larger public sectors tend to raise more resources 
                                                           
(
33)  For example, Lee and Gordon (2005) find for a sample of OECD and developing countries that a higher corporate tax rates 
reduces growth. However, when including a dummy for OECD countries the coefficient drops to nearly zero. See for 
example Valenduc (2008) for a discussion on indicators to assess the quality of revenue systems. 
(
34)  However, these numbers do not include most transition-economy recently acceded Member States who have, on average, a 
tax wedge below that of the old Member States. 
(
35) For more details on the revenue trends in the EU see Part IV of this report. See also Carone et al. (2007), Eurostat (2007) 
and OECD (2007c). 
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through these two channels (Graph 11). At the same time, revenue system structures have 
been fairly stable over time with changes reflecting largely cyclical fluctuations (Graph 12). 
In addition to the share of direct and indirect taxes, also the composition of direct taxes 
themselves matters for growth. Higher rates of income tax are found to be less detrimental to 
growth than higher corporate tax rates and social security contributions by employers (see 
for example, OECD 2007a,b, European Commission 2006c, Widmalm, 2001, Padovano and 
Galli, 2001, 2002). This results from a rather low elasticity of primary labour supply to tax 
changes. However, secondary income earners (i.e. additional members of a household that 
enter the labour market or adjust their hours worked) are found to be much more responsive. 
Thus, the overall effect depends on the degree of labour market participation and the setup of 
benefits systems. That growth is more strongly linked to corporate tax rates and employers' 
contributions has been attributed to the direct impact on costs and competitiveness. 
However, it should be noted that there is typically a clear trade-off, at least in the short run, 
between the economic growth and equity objectives as regards the choice on the structure of 
direct taxation.  
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Graph 12:Share of direct taxation and social security 












Transition-economy recently acceeded Member States
Note: Unweighted averages.
Source: Commission services.
Moreover, many other specific revenue system features need to be considered. For example, 
human capital formation could be negatively impacted by the progressivity of income 
taxation as it reduces the return on education (see OECD 2007b). At the same time however, 
it ensures a more even income distribution. Savings and investment decisions are affected by 
the taxation of capital income, profits and wealth, including the concrete design choices such 
as deductability or special treatments. For example, R&D expenditure and FDI are 
responsive to tax incentives. 
And lastly, the administrative efficiency, simplicity, transparency and stability of revenue 
systems can support growth  (
36). An efficient tax administration allows keeping the 
administrative burden on taxpayers and the public sector low (
37). Together with a simple 
and transparent tax code it can also ensure high tax compliance. Thus, an improvement in 
administrative efficiency could either translate into additional revenues or in a reduction of 
                                                           
(
36)  See for example Heady (2007). 
(
37)  Ratios of administrative costs to revenue collections have been collected by the OECD (2007d) but they are not well suited 
for cross-country comparisons given the range of factors that impact on them (e.g. differences in tax rates and structures 
and collection of social security contributions). 
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tax rates  (
38). At the same time, transparent and stable tax systems facilitate long-term 
savings and investment decisions, which may stimulate growth. 
In the EU much remains to be 
done to reduce administrative 
burdens and compliance costs. For 
instance, indicators on the time 
needed to comply with tax 
payments show large differences 
across countries reflecting also the 
different complexities of tax 
systems (see Graph 13). Countries 
with rather simple tax systems, 
including those with flat taxes 
(Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania) (
39) fair rather well, 
while others impose a much higher 
time burden for complying with 
tax payments on enterprises. 










































































Time to comply with tax payments (hours per month)
Note: Time to prepare, file and pay (or withhold) corporate income tax, value added or 
sales tax and labour taxes, including payroll taxes and social contributions based on a 
case study company. No data available for CY and MT. Averages are unweighted.
Source: World Bank and Price Waterhouse Coopers (2008). 
EU average
Average
2.6. FISCAL  GOVERNANCE 
Fiscal governance is a key building block to ensuring high quality of public finances (
40). It 
has been widely recognised that sound fiscal governance (including fiscal rules, fiscal 
institutions, budgetary procedures and medium-term frameworks) can address the deficit 
bias, the common pool problem associated with specific spending items financed out of the 
general budget and contribute to fiscal sustainability  (
41) This is achieved by providing 
constraints on or disincentives for time-inconsistent behaviour of policy makers. 
The EU's fiscal framework accounts for this experience. In addition to the supra-national 
deficit and debt rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), the Council Report of March 
2005 on the SGP reform explicitly recognised the important role that national fiscal rules and 
institutions can play in achieving sound budgetary positions. It called on Member States to 
"ensure that national procedures in the budgetary areas enable them to meet their 
obligations." Most recently (9 October 2007), the ECOFIN Council confirmed this view and 
also acknowledged that national rules-based multi-annual fiscal frameworks could help to 
adhere to medium-term budgetary plans. 
But budgetary outcomes and fiscal sustainability are not the only dimensions impacted by 
fiscal governance. Budgetary procedures, in particular, a greater focus on outputs and 
outcomes rather than inputs (e.g. performance-based budgeting) can help to improve the 
                                                           
(
38)  Institutional and organisational arrangements for tax administrations vary across countries but the 'taxpayer segment model' 
where services and enforcement functions are organised around segments of taxpayers (e.g. large, small/medium business, 
employees) rather than functions (e.g. registration, accounting, collection, audit) has become more popular (see OECD 
2007d). 
(
39) Surprisingly, despite the major tax reform in Slovakia in 2004, including the introduction of a flat tax, the 'time to comply' 
indicator is still very high. 
(
40) Fiscal governance is understood here as comprising all rules, regulations and procedures that impact on how the budgets 
and its components are being prepared, approved, carried out and monitored. The terms fiscal governance and fiscal 
frameworks are used interchangeably in this section. 
(
41)  See e.g. European Commission (2006a and 2007a), von Hagen and Harden (1994), Poterba and von Hagen (1999), Strauch 
and von Hagen (2000) and Hallerberg (2004).  
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efficiency of public expenditure. At the same time, by determining a rule for overall 
expenditure, they would allow to better focus policy discussions on spending priorities. 
The different aspects of fiscal governance, their links to QPF and EU performance are briefly 
discussed below.  
National numerical rules have become increasingly important across the EU and 
underpinned progress in fiscal consolidation. Work by the European Commission (2006a) 
showed that since 1990 more and more Member States have adopted fiscal rules, extended 
the rules' coverage or strengthened the rules specific features (
42). Graph 14 summarises this 
development over the past ten years based on an index that captures five features of fiscal 
rules: the statutory base, the nature of body in charge of monitoring and enforcing the rule, 
enforcement mechanisms and media visibility of the rule (
43). In all but one Member State 
the strength and coverage has improved unless it had already been very strong in the mid-
1990s. 






























































Note: The index measures the coverage and strength of national numerical fiscal rules taking into
account five criteria. It is standardised to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one 
























Strong fiscal rules (upper quartile)
Medium-strong fiscal rules (middle quartiles)
Weak fiscal rules (lower quartile)
Note: Based on the Commission's fiscal rules index. Strong-rule countries comprise 
those in the upper quartile of the index, medium-strong-rule countries are in the 
middle two quartiles and weak-rule countries are in the lower quartile.
Source:Commission services.
Moreover, the European Commission (2006a) showed that stronger fiscal rules were linked 
to better budgetary performance. At the same time, rules that focused on the expenditure side 
were associated with lower primary expenditure-to-GDP ratios. This impact of fiscal rules is 
also visualised in Graph  15. Countries with a high average fiscal rules index faired 
significantly better as regards budgetary positions and reduction in expenditure-to-GDP and 
debt ratios than those with the weakest fiscal rules. 
The link between numerical fiscal rule and stabilisation of output is however less clear cut. It 
has frequently been argued that rules-based frameworks could prevent flexible discretionary 
fiscal policy responses in times of shocks (see e.g. Anderson and Minarik, 2006). But in 
practice, fiscal policy has often moved with the cycle, with pro-cyclicality in industrial 
countries having been mostly a phenomenon of good economic times (
44). While there are no 
econometric studies yet on the link between cyclicality of fiscal policy and numerical fiscal 
                                                           
(
42)  See also Moulin and Wierts (2006) and Ayuso et al. (2007). For an example on how fiscal rules are operated in Sweden see 
Fischer (2005). 
(
43)  These five elements closely follow the one identified by Kopits and Symansky (1998) to promote budgetary discipline. 
(
44)  See for example Balassone and Kumar (2007), Manasse (2006), Alesina and Tabellini (2005).  
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rules, country experiences point to certain types of fiscal rules and specific design features 
being potentially helpful in limiting pro-cyclicality. In particular, expenditure rules 
(especially when nominal expenditure is capped), revenue rules (which define the use of 
windfall revenues) and budget balance rules (specified in cyclically adjusted terms or 
applicable over a whole business cycle) are supportive. Desirable design-features of fiscal 
rules include good coordination among the various levels of government, multi-annual 
horizons, strong political commitment and strong monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, 
for example through an independent institution.  
Another success factor for reducing the deficit bias is a multi-annual orientation of fiscal 
policy. A longer term horizon can either be enshrined in numerical fiscal rules or, more 
generally, in medium-term budgetary frameworks (MTBF). They make budget plans more 
transparent, which should facilitate medium-term decision making by private agents and, at 
the same time, lower the likelihood of political expenditure cycles. Moreover, MTBFs allow 
shifting the focus during the medium-term horizon away from the expenditure envelope as a 
whole toward the allocation of resources between and within Ministries. For most EU 
Member States, the stability 
and convergence programmes 
(SCP) are not the only MTBFs 
but they are typically 
supplemented by specific 
national setups (see European 
Commission, 2007a for a 
detailed review). Using the 
European Commission index 
on the quality of MTBFs 
(Graph 16) one finds a similar 
dispersion as for the fiscal 
rules index. But not all 
countries with strong fiscal 
rules necessarily also have a 
strong medium-orientation 
even though there is positive 
correlation across both aspects 
of fiscal governance.  
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Independent fiscal agencies are a third institutional mechanism to improve budgetary 
performance and foster medium-term orientation. Experience shows that governments often 
tend to be overly optimistic in the macroeconomic assumptions that underpin their budgets 
(see Jonung and Larch, 2004, Mühleisen et al., 2005, Strauch et al., 2004). For that reason, 
the forecasting function could be delegated to independent fiscal agencies ('fiscal councils') 
which at the  same time could  monitor  and assess  fiscal  performance (
45).  In practice, the 
                                                           
(
45) The literature also makes a case that fiscal policy implementation could be delegated to independent institutions, similar to 
monetary policy (Debrun et al. 2007) but in practice there is not much support for this proposal given that fiscal policy 












Note: Excludes BG, CY, EL and RO. MBTF index is calculated based on five criteria 
nd ranges from zero to two (see European Commission 2007a for more details). On 
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forecasting record of these institutions has 
been free of the bias that policy makers 
frequently exhibit (Jonung and Larch, 2006). 
In the EU, many Member States have 
independent fiscal institutions that serve as 
advisors and monitor fiscal performance. In 
most cases, national central banks also play 
this role. But only two Member States 
(Belgium and the Netherlands) rely on 
independent fiscal institutions to provide the 
macro forecasts for the budget and medium-
term budgetary plans (Table 6). 
While the above aspects of fiscal 
frameworks are mostly geared toward more 
fiscal discipline, specific setups of budgetary 
procedures  can  also  contribute   to  greater
Table 6:
Key features of independent fiscal agencies in the EU, 2005
Preparation of macro forecasts for 
budget
Preparation of non-binding macro 
forecasts
BE, NL AT, DE, DK, FR, IT, SE, UK
Monitoring of budget performance No independent fiscal agency
BE, DE, DK, EE, ES, FR, HU, IT, 
NL, PT, SE
CY, CZ, IE, LV, LT, LU, MT, PO, SL, 
SK
Source: Based on European Commission (2006a).
Note: National fiscal agencies are defined as independent bodies, other than the central 
bank, government or parliament, that prepare macroeconomic forecasts for the budget, 
monitor fiscal performance and/or advise the government on fiscal policy matters. The 
table does not include information for BG and RO. In the NL, macro forecasts by the 
Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) are not legally binding but in 
practice the CPB provides the macro forecasts for the budget. In the UK, the government 
also frequently follows the National Audit Office's (NAO) macro assumptions for the 
budget. 
spending efficiency  (
46). In particular, a greater results-orientation can create stronger 
incentives for raising public sector performance. The concept of performance-based 
budgeting has therefore gained popularity in and outside the EU. When fully implemented it 
would relate budgetary appropriations to performance, but only some countries, and just for 
few sectors (mainly education and tertiary education) go that far given many practical 
problems (see Box 2 for an overview on the various concepts and their use in EU Member 
States). Given these difficulties it seems that performance-based budgeting, while being a 
supportive instrument, can in itself not be a panacea for assuring good fiscal performance or 
high public spending efficiency.  
2.7.  MARKET EFFICIENCY AND BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 
Public finances, through budgetary and non-budgetary items, can also impact the functioning 
of markets and the business environment. While this can therefore be viewed as another 
dimension of QPF, there are very strong overlaps with the above-mentioned dimensions and 
public policy in general. Moreover, since assessing the links between structural reforms and 
growth would go far beyond the scope of this paper and is better dealt with under the Lisbon 
Strategy for Growth and Jobs (
47) only the key channels from public finances to growth are 
summarised below.  
In addition to the structure of tax and benefit systems and the provision of a public 
infrastructure, the efficiency of public administrations can be a factor for growth. The first 
two aspects have already been discussed in Sections  2.4 and 2.5  (
48).The role of public 
expenditure efficiency was also highlighted with the examples of educational and health 
spending but an additional point can be made about the efficiency and effectiveness of public 
administrations. Spending on general administrations in the EU is not negligible at 6.5% of  
                                                           
(
46) The discussion of fiscal governance elements here cannot be comprehensive. Other elements of importance, mostly to 
overall budgetary performance include budgetary transparency, top-down budgeting techniques and centralisation of the 
budget process and during execution (see Blöndal 2003). 
(
47)  See the European Commission's (2007b) progress report on the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs. For OECD countries, 
OECD (2008) contains an assessment of reforms as part of the 'Going for Growth' initiative. 
(
48) In addition to the key aspects of revenue systems discussed earlier, the interlinkages with benefit systems also need to be 
considered. In particular, the flexicurity concept, which involves labour market flexibility, unemployment benefits, active 
labour market policies and training and life-long learning is an approach to support growth and employment. 
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GDP (or 14 % of total public
spending), varying from 2.7%
of GDP in Estonia to 9.4% of
GDP in Hungary (Graph  17).
A number of countries have
therefore embarked on public
administration reforms (for an
overview see European
Commission, 2008d). They 
often involve establishing a
closer link between the use of
resources and results (Box 2), 
changing management
practices and relying more on
information technologies (e- 








































































Note: Unweighted EU average.
Source: Commission services based on COFOG data.
 
government) with the aim to raise public sector productivity and citizens' satisfaction. 
In a number of EU Member
States the room of
improvement in public
administration efficiency is
large. This results from a
range of indicators, of which
only three are described
below. First, the World
Bank Doing Business
indicator can be viewed as a 
proxy for the quality of
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Note: Index ranging from 1 to 7 based on exective opinion survey on "public spending in your country is wasteful (=1), 
provides necessary goods and services not provided by the market (=7)." 




administrations such as ease of dealing with licenses, opening and closing businesses, 
enforcing contracts, registering property, paying taxes, trading across borders (
49). Five EU 
Member States (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom) rank in the 
top 10% of the world (178 countries). Second, the World Bank Governance Indicator 
captures four public administration areas, namely government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law (both including enforcement) and control of corruption. In terms of 
government effectiveness, which has been assessed based on surveys among business 
executives, experts and citizens, the EU comes out somewhat below the non-EU 
comparators, largely because shortcomings are seen for many of the recently acceded 
Member States as well as Greece and Italy. And finally, the World Economic Forum's index 
on the 'wastefulness' of government spending, based on survey among managers, comes to a 
very similar result (Graph 18). 
                                                           
(
49) Other elements of the indicators, which are only indirectly linked to QPF are protecting investors, trading across borders, 
employing workers and getting credit. 





1/ This box was prepared by Stig Malmedal. 
Box 2: Performance-based budgeting - a summary of EU Member States experiences 1/ 
Performance-based budgeting (PBB) aims to increase the quality of public finances by strengthening the 
link between the allocation of budget resources and their outputs and outcomes. This is achieved by 
shifting budgeting and management away from input control towards a greater focus on results. The 
literature does not offer a single definition of PBB, but following the OECD (2007e) one can distinguish 
three levels, depending on the strength of the link between performance and funding: (i) presentational, 
(ii) performance-informed (PI) budgeting and (iii) direct/formula performance budgeting (see also 
Bouckaert and Halligan, 2006).  
Country experiences show that implementing a performance-based approach to budgeting, which is often 
part of larger public administration reform efforts, can be cumbersome. Problems include overcoming the 
often stiff resistance against organisational changes, the timely availability of performance data and, more 
generally, the measurability of performance (e.g. Curristine, 2005) as well as difficulties in avoiding to 
create distorted incentives (e.g. an over-emphasis on objectives that can be easily quantified (Smith, 
1995)). This explains why just a few countries have established pure PBB and typically only for a few 
selected areas (mostly health and higher education). Instead, most countries apply some form of 
'performance-informed budgeting' where decision-makers take performance data into consideration but no 
automatic link to budget allocations exists.  
The comparison on how EU Member States use PI below is based on the 2007 updated OECD/World 
Bank  Budget Practices and Procedures Database. While the database shows how the countries 
institutionalise their approach, it can provide only a rough indication to which extent a culture of 
performance is embedded in national organisations. The main results are summarised in Graphs 1-4. 
PI is used in all 20 EU Member States included in the database except Belgium and the Czech Republic 
(Graph 1). Member States use a mix of evaluation reports, performance measures, performance targets 
and/or benchmarking to assess the government's non-financial performance but only few use all of them. 
In particular, benchmarking is not yet very wide spread. Most countries use a combination of output and 
outcome measures as performance measures and/or targets, reflecting, on the one hand, the difficulty to 
identify measurable outcomes in all sectors and, on the other hand, the attempt to avoid that using output 
indicators alone could shift the attention away from the actual desired policy outcomes. These practices 
are in line with the guidelines developed by the OECD (2007f) on Designing and developing budget 
systems that use performance information.  
The formal responsibility of setting performance targets is given either to the relevant minister or the 
Cabinet as a whole in most Member States (Graph 2). Only Austria and Denmark make the administrative 
head of the relevant ministry formally responsible for the target setting, even though in practice this is the 
case in many other Member States as well. In several countries, the Minister of Finance is involved in 
setting performance targets informally, either alone or in cooperation with the relevant minister. In the 
United Kingdom, the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer share the responsibility of 
setting targets in practice. In most countries the relevant minister is responsible for achieving the targets, 
with the exception of the Prime Minister in Poland and the Director General in Denmark. In Finland both 
the relevant minister and the head of the agency are responsible for achieving the target, as the ministry 
and the agency are partners in a performance agreement. 
The authorities that most frequently use PI are the Central Budget Authority, the Minister of Finance or 
the responsible minister (Graph  3). They take advantage of the available PI during the budgetary 
decision-making process. Within the national parliaments the use of PI is less frequent, with only Finland 
and France and, to a lesser degree, Slovakia and Sweden regularly taking PI into account in the budget 
and sectoral committees. 
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Box  2 continued:  
When asked on how much of the budget is linked to performance targets, EU countries display vary 
diverse practices. Some include performance targets for all expenditures (FR, SK, SE), while others use 
no performance target in the budget documentation at all (AT, DK, LU, PL, SI). The differences are just 
as big when it comes to performance goals (e.g. FI and NL have goals covering all expenditure items, 
together with SK and SE). 
Graph 1:Types of performance information produced to assess 




































Notes: 20 EU Member States included (no data for BG, EE, CY, LT, LV, MT and RO). 
FI also uses analysis of personnel in their assessment.
Source: OECD Budget Practices and Procedures Database 2007.































Notes: 20 EU Member States included (no data for BG, EE, CY, LT, LV, MT and RO). 
Frequency ranges from 1 = Almost never (0-20%) to 5 = Almost always (81-100%).
Source: OECD Budget Practices and Procedures Database 2007.









































Notes: 20 EU Member States included (no data for BG, EE, CY, LT, LV, MT and RO). 
Frequency ranges from 1 = Almost never (0-20%) to 5 = Almost always (81-100%). The 
chief executive refers to either the President or Prime Minister.
Source: OECD Budget Practices and Procedures Database 2007.











































Notes: 20 EU Member States included (no data for BG, EE, CY, LT, LV, MT and RO). 
More than one response possible, i.e. the responsibility is shared.
Source: OECD Budget Practices and Procedures Database 2007.
 
The review on consequences, penalties or costs incurred when missing performance targets confirms the 
loose link between PI and funding (Graph 4). In general, across the 20 Member States considered on that 
matter, a budget reduction would rarely happen (in around one quarter of the cases a missed target leads 
to budget cuts). Other forms for disciplinary mechanisms, like pay reduction or consequences for future 
career opportunities for the responsible person(s) and elimination of the program, are also rarely being 
applied. Closer scrutiny in form of more intense monitoring is the most common consequence, used in 
close to 50% of the instances where targets are missed. 
Given the difficulty of linking performance measures directly to budget appropriation, the use of more 
comprehensive evaluation mechanisms are key when assessing programmes or sectors. Evaluation reports 
may even be a tool to determine the linkages between activities or programmes and outcomes (OECD, 
2005). Throughout the EU Member States, the line ministries conduct or authorise most types of 
evaluations. The involvement of the legislature in initiating evaluations is rarer and limited to a few 
countries (LU, NL, PL, FI, EL and FR).  
To sum up, EU Member States differ greatly in their use of PI, even though many countries have initiated 
reforms over the last years (OECD, 2007e). This partly reflects different country-specific needs, as 
highlighted by the OECD Guidelines, but also different degrees of progress in tackling the practical 
problems of PBB. Countries which have institutionalised PBB to the strongest degree in the EU include 
NL, FI, FR, SK and DK, but even in these countries the actual approach is rather that of 'performance-
informed budgeting' than direct performance budgeting. 
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3.  The quality of public finances and growth: 
bringing the dimensions together 
After having identified the many dimensions of QPF, the next step needed is to analyse their 
linkages to growth in a more comprehensive setting. This section, after a means comparison, 
investigates the links between QPF and growth by identifying growth components through a 
growth-accounting approach and relating them to the different dimensions of QPF by using a 
discriminant analysis. Based on these preliminary empirical findings avenues for future 
empirical research are indicated. 
3.1.  QUALITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES AND LONG-RUN GROWTH 
3.1.1. Does the quality of public finances matter for long-run growth? 
As a starting point and to summarise the findings from Section  2, a simple means 
comparison can help point to those aspects of QPF that seem to matter for long-term growth. 
Table 7 provides the average values of indicators representing the different dimensions of 
QPF as described in Section 2 for two different groups of countries: the high GDP-per-capita 
growth countries and the low GDP-per-capita growth countries, where the mean growth rate 
of the overall sample represents the reference value. The periods covered are 1980-1989 and 
1990-2005; besides the EU15 countries a number of non-EU industrialised countries are also 
included (Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and 
the United States). The table does not consider the dimension efficiency of expenditure 
described in Section 2.4 as only very short time series are available for the corresponding 
variables. Given the large structural changes in transition economies and the limited data 
availability, indicators for the EU27, i.e. EU15 + recently acceded Member States (RAMS) 
are reported in Columns (5) and (6) only for the period 1990-2005. All variables in Table 7 
are expressed in weighted average terms, using the value of the GDP per capita in 
purchasing power standard (PPS) terms as weights. Differences in mean values across 
country groups that are statistically significant are reported in bold (
50). 
Table 7 shows marked differences in countries' growth performance and QPF. These figures 
suggest that high-growth countries have tended to display lower public expenditure as 
percentage of GDP, lower public debt, lower public deficit and variability of public deficit, a 
lower (higher) weight of (indirect) direct taxation, a lower labour tax wedge and more 
flexible markets. This evidence tends to support existing findings in the growth and 
macroeconomic policy literature as discussed in Section 2. 
The difference between high and low-growth countries concerning government debt is not 
the one expected, however, for the period 1980-1990. This can mostly be attributed to Italy, 
Ireland, the UK and Japan, which experienced relatively high growth rates during this period 
while displaying relatively high debt levels. During the period 1990-2005, however, this 
situation was reversed and countries with relatively high growth rates of GDP per capita 
tended to have relatively low public debt. 
The widening difference in growth performances between high and low-growth countries 
was also accompanied by a growing divergence in QPF since the early the 1990s. During the 
                                                           
(
50) The statistical significance level has been calculated performing a Wald-test with the significance level set to 5%, where 
the null hypothesis is that the difference between mean values is equal to zero. Table  7 was also constructed using 
unweighted averages, which yielded very similar results. 
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1980s, only the indicators concerning public consumption, public investment and labour 
market regulation were significantly different between the two groups. During 1990-2005, 
however, all indicators of QPF also displayed significant differences as growth divergences 
widened. 
Table 7:
Growth and the quality of public finances: selected indicators for the EU and OECD countries
low growth high growth low growth high growth low growth high growth
Average GDP per capita growth rate 2.3% 3.3% 1.6% 3.3% 1.6% 3.0%
1. The size of the government
Government expenditure 41.0% 40.1% 40.8% 37.8% 48.6% 42.1%
2. Fiscal deficit and sustainabillity
Size of deficit -3.8% -3.9% -3.1% -0.1% -3.2% -3.0%
Variability of deficit -1.1% -1.0% -1.1% -0.4% -1.5% -0.9%
Public debt 50.6% 63.2% 73.8% 57.3% 65.0% 49.8%
3. Composition of expenditure
Consumption 27.9% 25.7% 26.8% 21.4% 26.5% 23.5%
Investment 2.7% 3.9% 2.9% 3.7% 2.4% 3.5%
4. Structure of revenues
Tax wedge on labour 35.5% 32.1% 34.7% 29.6% 44.8% 39.6%
Indirect taxes 9.7% 9.4% 10.0% 11.9% 13.1% 12.2%
Direct taxes 12.7% 12.5% 12.9% 10.2% 12.9% 10.1%
5. Fiscal governance
Overall fiscal rules index 0.0 0.0
Expenditure fiscal rules index 0.1 -0.1
6. Business environment (Fraser index)
Regulation 5.5 5.5 6.1 6.4 5.6 5.6
Credit regulation 7.3 7.4 7.7 8.0 7.7 8.4
Labour market regulation 4.3 5.3 5.1 5.4 5.0 5.6
Business regulation 6.3 6.8 6.4 7.0
Sources: European Commission (Ameco and Eurostat), OECD and Fraser Institute (available at: http://www.fraserinstitute.ca/).
All countries, 1980-1989 All countries, 1990-2005 EU27 countries, 1990-2005
Notes: Weighted (GDP in purchasing power standard) average reported. All variables are measured as percentage of GDP except the tax wedge, fiscal 
governance variables and the business environment variables. The tax wedge percentage includes employers' social security contributions. Business environment 
variables reflect structural rigidities in labour and capital markets and business environment and are taken from the Fraser database, a high value of the Fraser 
index indicating a high flexibility in each of the market considered under item 6. The variability of the deficit is measured by the ratio of the standard deviation of 
the deficit (or surplus) divided by the average value of the same variable for each country. Non-EU countries includes AU, CA, IS, JP, KO, NO, CH, NZ, US. 
Figures in bold denote statistically significant differences in variables (weighted) means across country groups
 
Also among EU Member States, differences in growth and QPF were significant. The last 
two columns of Table 7 provide the (weighted) mean values of the QPF variables for the low 
and high-growth country groups in the EU27. In addition to the aforementioned variables, 
the EU sample also includes two indicators of fiscal governance (as described in 
Section 2.5), but their mean values do not appear to be significant between high and low-
growth countries. The same applies to the average value of the fiscal deficit which, despite 
its lower value for the high-growth country groups, remains rather close to the corresponding 
value for the low-growth country group. Excluding fiscal governance and the government 
deficit, the high-growth countries displayed better performance in terms of the other 
dimensions of QPF as for the sample group including EU15 and other non-EU OECD 
countries. 
3 . 1 . 2 .  P u b l i c  p o l i c y  s p e n d i n g  v e r s u s  p o l i c y  o u t c o m e :  a  c l o s e r  l o o k  a t  h e a l t h  a n d  
education  
The simultaneity between growth performance and QPF, observed through the simple means 
comparison, does not necessarily imply a simple one-way causal relationship. There are 
several issues that need to be considered. First, better growth performance may itself 
improve QPF as, for instance, high-growth countries have better chances to reduce their debt 
ratio including a reduction of their expenditure ratios, or may find it easier to improve the 
quality of their education and health systems. Second, public policies do not necessarily have 
economic growth as the primary goal as mentioned previously. In particular social spending, 
such as on education and health, also serves income distribution and social cohesion 
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purposes. And third, changes in public policies are in most cases implemented only gradually 
and their influence on economic growth usually takes relatively long time to materialise. For 
instance, public spending in education or reforms of education systems can enhance the job 
prospects of future workers only after several cohorts of students have experienced these 
reforms.  


















4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0
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Graph 19: Public education spending, outcomes and GDP growth
. 5
 
Thus, focusing only on the level of public spending in certain 'growth-enhancing' categories 
rather than the outcomes of these policies will likely miss to capture the true effect of public 
policies on growth. Graphs  19 and 20 provide an illustration of these points for public 
spending on education and health. The left panel of Graph 19 plots the average value of 
public education spending against the average growth performance across a sample of 
OECD countries during the period 1980-2005. The relationship between the two variables 
appears counter-intuitive with more public education spending being associated with lower 
growth. However, when considering the outcome of education spending (
51), i.e. changes in 
educational attainment (right panel of Graph 19) the relationship to growth turns positive 
(Ireland appears as an outlier given its exceptional growth rate during the period). A similar 
pattern emerges for public spending on health (Graph 20). 
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Graph 20: Public spending in health, its outcomes and growth 
 
Overall, these results concerning two specific public policies, namely, education and health, 
tend to highlight the importance of efficiency of public spending. Analysing the link between 
public finances and growth thus requires considering the outcome of such policies and, more 
                                                           
(
51) Educational attainment is measured as average years of higher schooling in the total population during the period 1980-
2000T. his variable is taken from the Barro and Lee database, (see Barro and Lee, 1996 and Barro, 2003 for a description; 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html)  
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specifically, the link between the policies put in place (here spending in public health and 
education systems) and their respective objectives. Ideally, therefore, a proper understanding 
of QPF would allow explaining the relationship depicted in Graphs 19 and 20 and in 
particular the reasons why the same relationship cannot be found when considering the 
influence of the level of public spending on its desired outcome. 
3.2. OPENING THE BLACK-BOX: QUALITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES AND THE 
COMPONENTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Given the many dimensions and transmission channels of QPF as well as the many other 
drivers for growth that differ across countries, a promising angle of analysis is a growth-
accounting approach. This allows to first identify the sources of growth and then, in turn, try 
to link each of these growth components with the QPF variables most likely to influence 
them, which is likely to vary across countries. 
3.2.1. The sources of economic growth in EU countries  
Economic growth can present different patterns. Existing evidence suggests that in some 
countries labour skills, innovation and technological progress (via ICT diffusion for 
instance) were the main factors behind recent GDP growth evolutions (for instance, the 
Netherlands, Finland, Sweden). In other countries such as Spain, by contrast, increased 
labour market participation was the dominant factor (see for instance, van Ark and Inklaar, 
2005). A way to identify the sources of economic growth is therefore to decompose GDP 
growth rate into its main components using a growth-accounting approach.  
Graph  21 provides the results of a 
growth decomposition taken from 
the EU KLEMS database (see Box 3 
for more details)  (
52). The 
components considered in this 
exercise are: medium and high-
skilled labour, which are taken 
together, low-skilled labour, capital 
and total factor productivity. The 
analysis shows that, on average, 
during the period 1990-2004, the EU 
countries, Japan and the US differed 
widely regarding their growth 
patterns. As evidenced earlier, this 
period is also characterised by 
widening growth dispersion across  



































Note: See Box 3 and Koszerek et al. (2007) for definitions
Sources: Commission services and EU KLEMS database (www.EUKLEMS.net).
countries. For instance, the sources of growth for fast growing, catching-up countries such as 
Hungary, Slovenia or Poland appear to be very different. In the cases of Hungary and 
Poland, total factor productivity emerges as the main engine of growth, while in the case of 
Slovenia, capital services tended to drive most of the recent growth experience. 
Employment, including both low and high/medium-skilled workers, emerges as an important 
source of growth in Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium and the US. Overall, the dominant 
sources of growth appear to be capital services, explaining around half of the GDP growth 
                                                           
(
52) For data availability reasons, the set of countries considered in the growth-accounting exercise is limited to selected EU 
countries, Japan and the US. See EU KLEMS (2005) http://www.euklems.net/ for more details. 
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during the period considered, while total factor productivity explains a quarter and 
employment, mainly medium and high-skilled, explains the remaining quarter. 
Box  3: Growth-accounting analysis 
Growth accounting is an approach that identifies the components of GDP growth from the supply side by 
using a production function, typically of the Cobb-Douglas type. The contributions of each factor in the 
production process are calculated based on a set of assumptions, most importantly constant returns to 
scale and perfect competition. The production inputs include (i) labour (which can be further decomposed 
into highly-skilled, medium-skilled and low-skilled labour), (ii) capital (which can also be decomposed 
into ICT and non-ICT capital) and (iii) total factor productivity (TFP) which is the residual term and 
represents all non-observed elements, mainly technological progress. The Cobb-Douglas production 
function can be written as follows:  
L K v v L AK Y =  
Where Y stands for real output of a given country, K is an index of capital services, L is an index of labour 
services while A stands for all other factors. The standard accounting decomposition of total output 
growth into the contribution of each input and the multi-factor productivity is: 
A L v K v Y L K ln ln ln ln Δ + Δ + Δ = Δ  
The contributions of capital and labour (which, as indicated above, could be further decomposed) are the 
product of capital productivity ( K v ) and labour productivity ( L v ) and the changes in input factors. The 
last term  A Δ ln represent the Solow residual or total factor productivity term.  
Growth components for twelve old and four recently acceded Member States, the US, Japan and Canada 
have been calculated as part of the EU KLEMS project. KLEMS stands for 'capital', 'labour', 'energy', 
'material' and 'services'. The main aim of the  EU KLEMS project is to create a database on measures of 
economic growth, productivity, employment creation, capital formation and technological change at the 
industry level for all EU Member States from 1970 onwards. For a description of the project, the 
methodology, the main findings and the database (see http://www.euklems.net/ and Koszerek et al., 
2007). 
 
3.2.2. The quality of public finances and the sources of economic growth 
The question arises whether the differences in sources of growth can be linked to differences 
in QPF. This issue was considered in Fischer (1993) who suggested that most 
macroeconomic policy variables would likely influence growth through capital accumulation 
and productivity changes. Indeed a number of authors have made use of investment 
functions (rather than GDP growth equations) in order to analyse the influence of public 
policy on economic outcomes (see for instance Barro, 1991). Others have also considered the 
role played by tax and public policies, including fiscal policies, on employment changes (see 
for instance, Gray et al., 2007).  
We employ a discriminant analysis as a simple way to address the question on the link 
between QPF and overall growth as well as the sources of growth (see Box 4 for technical 
details on discriminant analysis). A discriminant analysis can help characterise the countries' 
growth performance assuming that no information on growth performance is available ex 
ante. One can then compare the hypothetical grouping that is obtained by using only the QPF 
variables with the 'true' one, i.e. the one obtained by using the GDP growth values. Such a 
comparison between hypothetical and true groupings of countries carried out by calculating 
canonical correlation coefficients is reported in the last row of Table 8. 
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Box  4: Canonical discriminant analysis  
Discriminant analysis is a statistical method which can be used to describe differences between a number of 
individuals (e.g. firms, consumers or countries) and to allocate observations to pre-defined groups. In 
performing such analysis it is possible to say whether the characteristics of these individuals may explain their 
grouping according to a set of pre-defined criteria. Here, a canonical discriminant analysis is undertaken in 
order to predict the membership of countries to groups with different growth patterns. The discriminating 
criteria are indicators gauging the quality of public finances (QPF) of the countries which are used in order to 
group countries. This grouping is then compared with the one obtained on the basis of their growth 
performance. The same method is applied by using, alternatively, each growth component rather than the 
overall growth rate (see Box 3 and Table 8). This method thus gives the possibility to test whether the groups 
of countries defined according to their growth performance are comparable to the ones obtained when using 
the QPF variables. This method thus consists in determining statistically whether the characteristics described 
by the indicators of QPF can systematically be linked to growth performance and the sources of growth. 
When considering the sources of growth, countries are classified in three classes: capital intensive growth 
(IK), TFP-intensive growth (ITFP), skilled-labour intensive growth (ISK). Xi denote the six main 
characteristics of the quality of public finances described in Section 2, each characteristic being represented by 
a set of variables. The objective is to use the set of X1…X6 classes of variables in order to group countries 
regarding their growth components in the best possible way, i.e., maximizing the between-group variance and 
minimizing the within-group variance. Assume a linear combination of the X variables such that: 
Z = a1X1 + … + a6X6  
pountries can be grouped using Z if the mean value changes significantly from country growth groups and the 
coefficient a1-a6 indicate the weight of each variable in the groups constructed which are, to some extent, 
equivalent to the coefficients (and their significance) estimated in multiple regression analysis. A F-ratio test 
can be performed such that the mean square of between and within groups variances is as large as possible. 
Several linear combinations (or canonical discriminant functions) of the X variables can be envisaged for 
separating countries (although not all of those may be statistically significant) into groups which ends up 
being an eigenvalue problem based on within and between-sample matrices of sums of square (see Manly, 
1986). Furthermore, the so-called canonical correlation R can be computed to measure the association 
between the groups formed by the dependent variables (here the growth performance) and the given 
discriminant function based on the X-variables representing QPF. When R  is zero, there is no relation 
between the groups and the function. When R is large, there is a high correlation between the discriminant 
functions and the groups such that in this latter case, the discriminant (i.e. PF) variables can be considered as 
good predictors of the growth performance of the countries considered. 
The figures reported in the preceding rows of Table 8 are the canonical loadings representing 
the weights of each QPF variable used in order to differentiate countries between growth 
groups. Here the absolute value of the coefficient obtained provides information which, to 
some extent, can be interpreted as an indication of the significance of an equivalent 
regression estimate (see Manly, 1986). These groups are defined by their GDP growth in the 
first column and the GDP growth components in the remaining columns (
53). According to 
the results in the first column, for instance, the share of public investment (with a positive 
sign) and the share of public consumption and the ratio of public debt over GDP (with a 
negative sign) appear to play a particularly significant role in discriminating between high 
and low-growth countries. The canonical correlation coefficients reported in the last row of 
the table provide information on the variance between groups, i.e. the extent to which 
countries are correctly classified into growth groups following the values of their QPF 
variables. This coefficient appears to be especially high for the capital component of growth 
                                                           
(
53) The contribution of low-skilled labour to GDP growth is not considered here as this component was never the most 
important one for GDP growth during the period and for the countries considered. 
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suggesting that the QPF indicators allow classifying countries rather accurately according to 
their effect on capital accumulation. 
Table 8:
The sources of growth and the quality of public finances, 1990-2004
GDP growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High vs low GDP 
growth
High vs low capital 
contribution to GDP 
growth
High vs low TFP* 
contribution to GDP 
growth
High vs low-skilled 
labour contribution to 
GDP growth
Primary budget balance 0.018 0.076 -0.057 0.135
Debt -0.332 -0.283 -0.075 -0.366
Public consumption -0.422 -0.234 0.295 -0.233
Public investment 0.561 0.448 0.066 -0.104
Direct tax -0.325 -0.127 -0.025 0.054
Indirect tax -0.110 -0.284 0.543 0.040
Tax wedge -0.293 -0.264 0.188 -0.255
Market flexibility 0.029 0.020 -0.173 0.120
Canonical correlation 0.760 0.910 0.760 0.740
Notes: Results of canonical discriminant analysis. See Box 4 for a description of the methodology used. The definition of variables is the same as for Table 7. 
Countries covered: AT, BE, CZ, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, HU, IT, JP, LU, NL, PL, SE, UK, US. 
Growth components
Source: Data on GDP growth and its components based on the EU KLEMS (www.EUKLEMS.net) database and Commission services.
Results of discriminant analyisis: canonical loadings
* TFP: total factor productivity
 
Overall, the signs of the variables in Table 8 correspond to the expectations discussed in 
Section 2. Countries with high debt, low public deficit, high public consumption, high direct 
taxes over GDP and a high tax wedge on labour tend to display lower growth performances. 
Countries with high public investment and flexible markets tend to have higher GDP growth 
rates.  
The results concerning the growth components in columns (2) to (4) provide indications 
broadly in line with those on overall growth. In particular, the analysis concerning the 
contribution of capital accumulation to GDP growth suggests a high correlation of this 
variable with the QPF variables. A noticeable exception concerns the link between TFP and 
overall market flexibility shown in Column (3). This relationship turns out to be negative 
meaning that more flexible market economies have also tended to experience a lower 
contribution of TFP to overall GDP growth. Existing evidence tends to suggest that the 
relationship between TFP and market flexibility is not clear cut. For instance, Aghion et al. 
(2006) find that the relationship between innovation, a main driver for TFP growth, and 
competition follows and inverted-U shaped relationship. In a recent paper also Roeger et al. 
(2008) show that the effect of lowering mark-ups, which goes along with greater market 
flexibility (though greater competition and firms' entry) depends on the sector that is being 
considered. The evidence provided by these authors suggests that a greater flexibility in 
intermediate-product sectors of activity has a negative impact on TFP while in final-product 
sectors it has a positive impact. Such result could be explained by the fact that mark-ups 
cover fixed costs while less regulation could discourage innovation and lower TFP. 
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3.2.3. Public finances, policy outcomes and the sources of economic growth 
The results of the discriminant analysis suggest that the characteristics of countries with 
regard to QPF can be used to make inference about their growth performance and also to the 
sources of growth. The latter appears particularly true for the contribution of capital to 
growth. Given that capital 
accumulation was also one the 
main driver of growth in the 
sample of countries considered, a 
closer investigation of the link 
between QPF and the contribution 
of capital investment to growth 
seems particularly relevant. 
Graph  22 illustrates this by 
showing the evolution of the 
contribution of capital to growth 
during the period 1990-2004 for 
high and low- debt countries  (
54). 
In general, countries with a low 
government debt-to-GDP ratio also 
had a significantly higher 
contribution of capital to growth, 
suggesting a crowding-out effect 
of public debt on private 
investment. The above result tends to be in line with existing empirical evidence regarding 
the effect of fiscal policy on growth. For instance, Alesina et al. (2002) show, using a panel 
of OECD countries, that a reduction of the size of government (measured by total spending 
and total taxation over GDP) increases the private accumulation of capital.  
Graph 22:Contribution of capital to GDP growth: 
















Sources: Comission services and EU KLEMS (www.EUKLEMS.net).
Graph 23 repeats the same exercise grouping countries according to the degree of flexibility 
of their markets. The latter is measured by Fraser index already used in Table 8 with a higher 
value indicating more flexibility  (
55). 
Differences appear to be less 
pronounced in terms of contribution of 
capital to GDP growth between the 
two groups of countries although on 
average, countries with the most 
flexible markets also experienced a 
higher contribution of capital to GDP 
growth during the whole period. This 
result indeed corresponds to the one 
obtained through discriminant analysis 
is reported in Table 8 suggesting that, 
in fostering the contribution of capital 
investment to growth, market 
flexibility does play a positive albeit 
relatively minor role. 
Graph 23:Contribution of capital to GDP growth: most 




















Sources: Commission services and EU KLEMS (www.EUKLEMS.net).
                                                           
(
54) Annual figures are smoothed using a three-year moving average. The five countries with the lowest debt are grouped 
together into the low-debt group. The remaining countries are grouped into the high-debt countries. 
(
55) The Fraser indicator on market flexibility is used here instead of alternative measures, such as the World Bank Doing 
Business Indicator, because of the longer time coverage. 
  37 
Regarding the contribution of skilled labour to growth, the investigation includes both a 
policy input variable, namely public expenditure on education and a policy outcome 
variable, namely, the level of education attainment. Graph 24 shows the evolution of the 
contribution of skilled labour to GDP growth splitting countries according to the level of 
their public spending in education. No significant differences emerge between the groups of 
countries. In particular, the negative evolution of the contribution of skilled labour during the 
early 1990s is due to the experience of countries with high public education spending such as 
Finland (which suffered a strong recession in the early 1990s) and also, to some extent, 
Denmark. Overall though, the evolutions for the two groups are relatively similar on 
average. Graph 25 shows instead the evolution of the contribution of skilled labour to growth 
in relation to the level of secondary and higher education attainment. The data indicate that 
countries with better educated workforces also benefited from a larger contribution of skilled 
labour to growth although at the end of the period this difference has tended to revert 
somewhat with the economic slowdown at the beginning of the 2000s. 
Graph 24: Contribution of skilled labour to GDP growth: 
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Graph 25: Contribution of skilled labour to GDP growth: 
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More generally, the outcome of public policy depends crucially on the spending level and 
their efficiency but also on other factors. In particular, concerning education, the functioning 
of labour markets is likely to play a conditioning role. Education policies (through high 
public spending in education) may 
have little impact on workforce 
qualification if labour market settings 
are not the appropriate ones through, 
for instance, insufficient labour skills' 
matching or the existence of 
burdensome labour regulations, in 
particular concerning (highly 
educated) young workers. Rigid or 
badly performing labour markets may 
hinder education and training policies 
and, by the same token, deter a higher 
contribution of skilled labour to 
economic growth. These conjectures 
are to some extent supported by 
Graph 26 which plots the evolution of 
the contribution of skilled labour to 
growth, grouping countries according 
to the degree of flexibility of their 
labour market (using, as before, the indicators on labour market flexibility of the Fraser 
Graph 26: Contribution of skilled labour to GDP 
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database). The data indicate that countries with a more rigid labour market have also 
benefited less from the contribution of skilled labour to GDP growth. This result needs to be 
qualified in light of the existing literature, however. For instance, Agell and Lommerud 
(1997) suggest that rigid labour markets may give rise to higher incentives for human capital 
investment. Other authors have suggested instead that rigid markets may prevent that those 
skills can effectively be used in high-tech/high growth potential production activities due to 
the higher labour costs (see e.g. Saint-Paul, 2002).  
Finally, Graph  27 considers the 
influence of market rigidities on TFP. 
Here the evolutions appear to be much 
more volatile than for the other growth 
components as mentioned before. This 
is not surprising given that TFP is in 
fact a residual of the production 
function. Despite a higher volatility, 
the countries with the most flexible 
markets appear to be the ones 
benefiting more from TFP changes. 
This result suggests that the overall 
negative relationship between market 
rigidities and TFP found earlier when 
considering average figures may 
possibly hide different underlying 
dynamics given the high volatility of 
the TFP component.  
Graph 27: Contribution of total factor productivity 
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More generally, further caution is in order due to the cyclicality of the growth components 
considered in Graphs 23-27. This is particularly salient in the case of the contribution of TFP 
but also applies to the other growth components. The issue can be tackled by considering 
countries' individual series over longer time spans in order to remove the influence of the 
business cycle which, in some cases, may blur the overall relationship between QPF and 
growth components. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper sets out a multi-dimensional approach to analysing QPF with a view to providing 
a better basis for policy recommendations and eventually better linking the EU's fiscal 
governance tools that deal with QPF. The review of the empirical and theoretical literature as 
well as own empirical analysis can be summarised as follows.  
First, sound overall public finances, i.e. strong and sustainable budgetary positions and debt 
levels remain the linchpin of fiscal policy-making conducive to economic growth. This is, 
for example, supported by the empirical analysis that shows that high public debt tends to be 
associated with lower private capital investment reflecting crowding effect of private 
investment. But good fiscal performance is not enough to support long-run growth. It needs 
to be accompanied by high quality of public finances in other dimensions.  
Second, when public administrations become too large they tend, in general, to hinder 
economic growth in particular if they are associated with high tax burdens on labour and 
capital and inefficient use of public resources. Problems are compounded by large deficits 
  39 
and debt. On the other hand, when governments excel in these other dimensions of QPF, 
large public sectors can go hand in hand with strong growth performances.  
Third, whether certain types of public expenditure (such as public spending on education and 
health) are growth-enhancing largely depends on their ability to address market failures and 
provide public goods. For example, the discriminant analysis shows that high education 
attainment, rather than high education expenditure, tends to foster the contribution of skilled 
labour to GDP growth. Thus, it is rather the outcomes (such as a public infrastructure or 
educational attainment) than the level of inputs that matter for growth.  
Fourth, in light of rising pressures on public finances and the importance of spending 
outcomes for growth, a key focus for policy makers should be on raising the efficiency and 
effectiveness of public spending.  
Fifth, revenue structures that limit distortions and disincentives (e.g. indirect taxes on 
consumption rather than direct taxes on labour and capital) are typically associated with 
higher growth. However, when deciding on tax structures there are clear trade-offs between 
the growth and other objectives (such as income distribution and fairness), which need to be 
fully taken into account. 
And finally, achieving results on all of the above fronts of QPF can be facilitated by strong 
fiscal governance frameworks. They can contribute not only to better budgetary performance 
and thereby fiscal sustainability but also to a more medium-term orientation with better focus 
on budgetary priorities and greater efficiency and effectiveness.  
The multi-dimensional concept of QPF gives fiscal policy makers a wide range of policy 
options in support of economic growth. The many policy levers of QPF allow choosing 
various policy mixes which can explicitly account also for other country-specific objectives. 
But it is clear that choices need to be made. For example, a rather large public sector can 
only remain compatible with strong growth prospects if accompanied by sustainable 
budgetary positions and debt levels, efficient public administrations, spending and revenue 
systems that are supported by strong fiscal institutions. 
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